ABSTRACT
In 1937, Lord Atkin in Andrews v. DPP defined "manslaughter" which is now applied to corporations and called "corporate manslaughter." 16 The offence is obviously committed by a human agent, but it is attributed to corporation due to a specific relationship between such an agent and corporation. Besides regulatory offences (quasi-crimes), a corporation can only be held liable when the offence is virtually committed by individuals who manage and control, and thereby embody, the company. 17 Manslaughter is not a crime of intent, rather more an offence of recklessness or negligence. The conduct of robots causing human deaths affects the fundamental concepts of criminal law, such as culpability warranting punishment. 18 This research chiefly looks for the manslaughter liability of the employer of the victim (the employer) and its officers (together, "the user side") under criminal law from the viewpoint of OHS. However, brief references to the liability of the user side under OHS and civil laws and the civil liability of the supply side of robots will also be made where appropriate.
Part II briefly discusses robots, corporations and corporate criminal liability. Part III analyses the definitions and constituting elements of manslaughter by criminal negligence (MCN) under the principles of common law and statutory laws as applicable in New South Wales (NSW), a leading common law jurisdiction in Australia. Part IV endeavours to identify the persons who should go on trial for deaths caused by robots at the workplace in light of the legal principles analysed in the preceding Part III. Finally, Part V presents conclusions.
II. ROBOTS, CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
There is no universally accepted definition of the word "robot," which originated in a 1921 science-fiction play titled R.U.R., when it used the The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) defines "robot" by ISO8373, which describes it as an "automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes, which may be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications." 22 Modern sophisticated robots are complex products, as exemplified by their five characteristics. These are: "size," "mobility," "connectivity" (meaning that they can communicate information), "autonomy" (recognising their physical ability to independently respond to external input), and "intelligence" (referring to "the rate at which the machine can receive, evaluate, use, and transmit information, and the extent, if any, to which it can learn from experience and use this learning in determining future responses"). 23 Robots are programmed to perform certain tasks and are designed in a way to achieve the desired result most effectively. In sum, robots are machines that have some degree of autonomy and artificial intelligence to act like humans in specific areas of human labour depending upon their programming. Hence, we definitely recognise the ability of IRs to cause harm including injuring and killing humans around them at work. The cause and source of such an ability is the main concern of this Article.
A "corporation" initially emerged as an association of humans. 24 However, while corporations may now be comprised of a single individual, such organisations still need to be corporatised under certain laws in order to 19 Hubbard, supra note 4, at 1806 n.1. 20 Id. 21 A.S. HORNBY, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1107 (Joanna Turnbull et al. eds., 8th ed. 2010). 22 INT'L FED'N OF ROBOTICS, supra note 2. It also provides meanings of the words used in the definition: Reprogrammable: whose programmed motions or auxiliary functions may be changed without physical alterations; Multipurpose: capable of being adapted to a different application with physical alterations; Physical alterations: alteration of the mechanical structure or control system except for changes of programming cassettes, ROMs, etc. Axis: direction used to specify the robot motion in a linear or rotary mode. Id. 23 Hubbard, supra note 4, at 1807. 24 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
obtain legal personhood. 25 A company, in legal concept, can be defined as "an entity created by law conferring artificial personality to represent individuals who operate it for profits or other purposes with perpetuity in its existence and simplicity in its contractual relations." 26 Pinto and Evans describe a corporation as "merely [a] creature of statute without human characteristics governed by a series of rules." 27 Some enlightened descriptions were provided in an early British corporate law case, 28 which was concerned with the concept of "control" and "enemy character" of a company. In Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Daimler Co., Lord Reading CJ pronounced that the fact of incorporation was not just a "technicality." He stated that:
[A company] is a living thing with a separate existence which cannot be swept aside as a technicality. It is not a mere name or mask or cloak or device to conceal the identity of persons and it is not suggested that the company was formed for any dishonest or fraudulent purpose. It is a legal body clothed with the form prescribed by the Legislature.
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In his dissenting judgement, Buckley LJ opined that:
The artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical existence. It exists only in contemplation of law. It has neither body, parts, nor passions. It cannot wear weapons nor serve in the wars. It can be neither loyal nor disloyal. It cannot compass treason. It can be neither friend nor enemy. Apart from its corporators it can have neither thoughts, wishes, nor intentions, for it has no mind other than the minds of the corporators. These considerations seem to me essential to bear in mind. . . . Even before all of the above assertions, Lord Chancellor Thurlow said in the 18th century: "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?" 32 All of these definitions and descriptions of robots and corporations indisputably depict that robots and corporations are different, not only in the eyes of law, but in fact. Nonetheless, there were and still are arguments against the imposition of criminal sanctions on corporations. 33 Despite such oppositions, the corporate criminal liability is now widely recognised and applied worldwide, exceptions apart; 34 whereas robots' legal personality is yet to be conferred.
Although its criminal liability is recognised, a corporation cannot be held responsible for certain crimes;
35 however, it can be convicted of manslaughter in common law, 36 In NSW, the penalty is prescribed in section 24 of the Crimes Act 1900, while its section 19(1)(b) effectively leaves the definitions of manslaughter to be determined by the judiciary, or, in other words, the common law. Hence, NSW follows the common law definition of MCN, and we will analyse that definition and apply it to the scenario involving IRs in order to analyse when the employer corporation, its senior executives, and other employees can be held responsible. Notably, the High Court of Australia (HCA), the highest court of the country, confirmed in Hamilton v Whitehead that the common law identification theory, to be discussed further below, applies in Australia.
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Both corporations and individuals can be held liable for manslaughter. However, corporations can theoretically be held liable for manslaughter in all jurisdictions across Australia under the prevailing legal regimes, like many other countries, while an individual's liability for such a heinous offence is recognised throughout the globe. This Article considers the liability of both corporations and individuals in NSW, using the case law of other jurisdictions where appropriate.
III. MANSLAUGHTER-DEFINITIONS AND CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS
An unlawful homicide is one of the most heinous offences in all societies. Such homicides are categorised into murder and manslaughter. 40 To simply distinguish between these two, murder is generally an intentional and unlawful killing of another person without justification or a valid excuse, whereas manslaughter is causing death of another person unintentionally or intentionally with justification or a valid excuse. 41 In some jurisdictions, such 38 Manslaughter can be an alternative verdict against a murder charge if the elements of murder are not proved beyond reasonable doubt but those of manslaughter are successfully made out instead. 43 Manslaughter is subcategorised into two; namely, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, in which the word "voluntary" is attached to the accused's act that caused the victim's demise. 44 Compared to involuntary manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter is more violent in that all of the physical and mental elements of murder are satisfied. Nonetheless, the accused's culpability is downgraded to manslaughter because of successful reliance on a defence called provocation or substantial impairment by abnormality of mind, or excessive self-defence. 45 Involuntary manslaughter in common law is again subdivided into manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act (MUDA), and manslaughter by criminal negligence (MCN). As the name itself suggests, MUDA refers to an unintentional killing of another by an intentional or voluntary act that is contrary to criminal law and dangerous as well. 46 As defined by the HCA in Wilson v R, a person commits MUDA "only where an unlawful act gives rise to a belief on the part of a reasonable person that someone is being exposed to an appreciable risk of serious injury." 47 In our understanding of workplace deaths by robotic hands, MCN is more relevant than MUDA. Thus, this Article explores MCN alone.
A. Manslaughter by Criminal Negligence
MCN is originally a creation of common law though later incorporated into legislation in many jurisdictions. 48 49 This means that the offence of MCN, whether committed by a corporation or a natural person as an individual, is exactly the same crime and is distinguished only by the imputation of the latter's (i.e., the individual's) negligent conduct and mental state to the former due to their existing relationship when it comes to corporate manslaughter. Such an imputation is essential to convict the company under the common law identification doctrine, also known as the theory of directing mind or organic theory (these three names are used interchangeably).
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The law of negligence can be traced back to 1883 when Brett MR, in Heaven v. Pender, stated in dicta that "whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another . . . whereby he may cause danger of injury . . . a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger." 51 However, the principles of modern negligence law were articulated by the House of Lords in 1932 when the law of negligence had embraced the neighbourhood principle formulated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson. 52 The neighbourhood principle applies to ascertain the existence of duty of care. The principle is that:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? . . . You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? . . . persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 53 Though originated in a civil suit, the House of Lords in R v. Adomako held that the ordinary principles of the law of negligence governing civil disputes apply to MCN in the determination of the existence of duty and the 49 breach thereof. 54 Central to MCN is the existence of the common law duty of care, which must be owed by the accused to the victim. The duty of care is required to be legally enforceable although it may not be overtly imposed by legislation, but a mere moral obligation is insufficient. 55 The duty may exist in various ways; it can be implied by law, stemmed from contract or certain relationships, or voluntarily assumed. set down a similar set of four requirements which have been reaffirmed by the House of Lords in R v. Adomako. 60 The four elements as directed by the trial judge to the jury and later affirmed by the NSWCCA are as follows:
Existence of duty of care: That the accused owed a duty of care to the deceased.
ii.
Breach of duty of care by negligent conduct: That the accused was negligent in that, he/she breached the duty of care by his/her act(s) or omission(s), meaning he/she did something that a reasonable person in his/her position would not do or he/she failed to do something that a reasonable person in his/her position would have done.
iii. Grossly or wickedly negligent conduct: That the breach of duty fell so far short of the standard of care that a reasonable person in his/her position would have exercised, and it involved such a risk of death or serious bodily harm as to constitute, 'gross' or 'wicked' negligence and be treated as criminal conduct. 54 These four elements of MCN apply to both natural and artificial persons with respect to criminal liability for workplace deaths in common law jurisdictions unless statutes provide otherwise. 62 A successful conviction calls for all of the above four elements to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
B. Proving the Elements of MCN

Proving the Existence of a Duty of Care Owed to the Deceased
In order to facilitate the proof of existence of a duty of care, common law has developed some established categories of relationships in which the court shall presume that such a duty exists simply by virtue of those relationships. They include, inter alia, the relationship between an employer and its employees and that between a manufacturer and its consumers. 63 Employers owe a duty of care to their employees, 64 and an employer includes both the corporation and its managing director or chief executive. 65 The employment relation is founded on a contract. Wright J in R v Pittwood held that, with regard to a duty of care and a contractual relationship, it is immaterial whether the duty is owed to the company as the employer or to the victim, because a contractual duty in itself is a sufficient basis for criminal liability to arise from omission irrespective of to whom the duty is owed. 66 On the other hand, the modern law of negligence originated with the recognition of manufacturer's liability for personal injuries to potential users of its products as was the issue and the decision thereon of the House of Lords 61 Cittadini v R [2009] NSWCCA 302, ¶ 29. 62 In the United Kingdom, the common law principles were applicable to both natural persons and corporations until the enactment the Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, § § 2(6), 20, which aims to exclusively deal with corporate killings. So, corporate manslaughter is governed under this legislation in the United Kingdom. 63 The relationship between manufacturers and their consumers is mentioned because references to manufacturers' civil liability will be made further below. 64 67 It is therefore clear in common law that both the employer and the manufacturer owe a duty of care to their employees and product users respectively.
Apart from this common law imposition of a duty of care, statutes may ascribe such a duty to anyone, regardless of any relationship. 68 In circumstances in which neither common law nor statutes have defined the existence of a duty of care, courts will determine the duty on a case-by-case basis, which involves both a question of law and a question of fact. French CJ of the HCA in Burns v The Queen pronounced that it is for the judge to resolve the question of law whether a particular set of facts gives rise to a duty of care, whilst the jury will decide the existence of those facts. 69 So, the liability of individuals who could be potentially liable for MCN apparently committed by an IR would be judged separately in line with the relevant facts surrounding the person and his/her disputed conduct in the light of the four elements of MCN discussed above. However, the neighbourhood principle arguably imposes a duty of care on all of the creators and users of the machine so far as the requirements set forth in the principle as discussed earlier are satisfied. 70 Australian courts do follow this general principle approach to the determination of the existence of a duty of care and related liabilities. 71 It is worthy of mention that when robots are being made for commercial purposes, any reasonable person involved in the making process must foresee that any defects in the product will injure his/her "neighbour." It is not necessary that a particular victim's injury be reasonably foreseeable-it is sufficient that it is reasonably foreseeable that a class of persons could potentially be harmed. 72 Similarly, reasonable work supervisors must realise that if any safety measures are required to be taken to avoid potential accidents as might have been disclosed by the manufacturer with the product or purchase documents, ignorance of such requirements may eventuate in MCN. Therefore, we can argue that all individuals related to the creation and operation of an IR along with the employer as well as the manufacturer owe a duty of care to a potential victim of such a robot in the workplace. The existence of a duty of care can thus be easily proved against both corporations and individuals involved in the making and using of errant IRs.
Proving the Breach of a Duty of Care Owed to the Deceased
French CJ of the HCA in Burns v The Queen pronounced that no liability, civil or criminal, arises at common law for negligence unless the negligent conduct involves a breach of a duty of care owed to another. 73 In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the prosecution shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment.
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The Court mentions only "the act," which inherently includes "the omission" with respect to MCN. 78 When it comes to "an act" constituting MCN, the action need not be unlawful, but must have been committed negligently and voluntarily. 79 An act will be regarded as voluntary if it is subject to the control and discretion of the defendant. 80 The voluntariness of an act is unrelated to its consequence ( in MCN, death) if the accused was conscious of the nature of the act causing the death of the victim or another, and nonetheless chose to commit an act of that nature. 81 A lack of such consciousness or awareness of the nature of the act will render the conduct involuntary; however, the most critical consideration is a lack of exercise of the accused's will power. 82 The lack of exercise of will power represents negligence in the conduct of the offence. So, in order to satisfy the physical part of the offence, the prosecution will have to prove that the accused committed the act or omission causing death in question without exercising her will power in the circumstances where no defences can be relied upon to avoid liability.
The conduct in breach of the duty needs to be without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm, 83 showing a great failure to act as a reasonable person causing death of another that justifies criminal penalty (as quoted above). 84 To further clarify, the Court in Nydam v R refers to the accused's appreciation of the "probability" of death or serious bodily harm that merits criminal punishment, 85 and the HCA has implicitly approved this in The Queen v Lavender, 86 as mentioned above. 87 "The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk to safety which is likely to result in serious injury or death is a factor which will be relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the offence," while the degree of foreseeability will be considered in assessing the level of the accused's culpability. 88 Further, regarding a breach of a duty of care by omission, the House of Lords held in R v. Miller that a person may be held liable for homicide for "failing to take measures that lie within one's power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created." 89 Again, it means a failure to exercise will power. In DPP v Esso Australia Pty Ltd, the Supreme Court of Victoria convicted the company and imposed the fine for two failures: failure to 81 90 For a workplace death, a company can be convicted for both overt and hidden (latent) failures to prevent the incident. 91 Covert failures include design failures, insufficient training, and inadequate supervision. 92 The consequences of covert failures do not become apparent immediately; rather, they are delayed and occur at a later time. 93 Proving negligent conduct has always been a difficult issue. 94 The negligence that merits criminal sanction needs to be gross or wicked negligence in exclusion of simple carelessness and the omission has to be conscious and voluntary to commit MCN. In directing the jury in R v Nicholls, Brett J described the high degree of negligence required as "wicked negligence" meaning "negligence so great, that you must be of the opinion that the prisoner had a wicked mind, in the sense that she was reckless and careless whether the creature died or not." 95 Whether the accused's conduct was grossly or wickedly negligent is a question of fact. 96 An objective test applies to determine the grossness or wickedness of negligence, 97 so also to determine probability or foreseeability of the risk. 98 When the defendant is a corporation, the gross negligent conduct will be judged against the standard of care of a reasonable entity. 99 The objective test 100 is not purely objective when it is applied to manslaughter offenceswhen that is the case, it is effectively a hybrid test. 101 Its objectivity is somewhat diminished in that, in order to assess whether the disputed breach occurred, as the NSWCCA in R v Cornelissen pronounced, the jury must be directed that the reasonable person under the objective test should be placed in the accused's position. 102 The HCA, in The Queen v Lavender, explained that the objective test contemplates: a reasonable person who possesses the same personal attributes as the accused, that is to say a person of the same age, having the same experience and knowledge as the accused and the circumstances in which he found himself, and having the ordinary fortitude and strength of mind which a reasonable person would have . . . .
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Consistently, explaining the meaning attributing accused's characteristics to the reasonable person, the New South Wales Supreme Court (NSWSC) most recently held in R v Thomas that the reasonable person shall be attributed the awareness and knowledge of the circumstances of the act causing victim's death. 104 The Court further adds as "objectively ascertainable attribute[s]" that the accused's age 105 or a moderate or extreme intellectual disability can also be taken into account in determining whether the reasonable person in the accused's position would have realised that the act involved risks.
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In The Queen v Lavender, the HCA provided further clarity to the objective test:
If there had been some particular fact or circumstance which the [accused] knew, or thought he knew and which contributed to that opinion, and the jury had been informed of that, and the counsel had asked for a direction about it, then it may have been appropriate to invite the jury to take that into account. 107 Therefore, to constitute a breach, the negligent conduct must be grossly or wickedly negligent-a question of fact 108 which must be proven by relying on an objective test. 109 However, foregoing judicial decisions dictate that the objective test is significantly influenced by the subjective elements of the accused. To minimise this subjectivity, 110 The HCA echoed this view, holding that the Crown is not required to prove the accused's subjective appreciation that "he was being negligent or that he was being negligent to such a high degree." 111 All of these reinforce the exceedingly high degree of negligence that must be proven in order to convict an accused of MCN-the mere appreciation of risk will not suffice.
When the offence is committed by an individual, the breach of a duty of care by the required degree of negligence has to be proved directly against the accused natural person. With respect to a breach by a company that involves an IR, the breach has to be committed by one or more of the potentially liable natural persons from the user side when it comes to workplace safety. 112 Once the breach by an individual has been proved, the prosecution bears the onus to further prove in order to convict a corporation that the breach was committed by the directing mind and will (DM) of the company in accordance with the identification doctrine. 113 This has generally been a challenging part in a prosecution of corporate manslaughter in that the doctrine may shield the company from liability when the breach is committed by an employee who cannot be defined as a DM. The application of the identification doctrine is imperative in common law because vicarious liability does not apply to MCN. 
Criminal Breach of a Duty of Care by Companies Applying Identification Doctrine
Lord Blackburn in The Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association Ltd. expressed the view in 1880 that ". . . a corporation cannot, in one sense, commit a crime-a corporation cannot be imprisoned . . . ."
115 Corporations, as an abstraction and artificial entity, cannot commit any offence without using the hands and minds of humans; they are absolutely dependent upon human agents for their business operations. So a corporation can be liable when humans' conduct is attributed to it. Out of the numerous people that work for a large corporation, some individuals may be regarded as the DM whilst others are treated merely as hands of the entity. 116 In 118 when its hands (employees other than the DM) commit a wrong in acting within the scope of employment but going beyond the directions of the DM. In spite of the fact that vicarious liability can arise generally from breaches of civil law (torts, contract), common law does not impose such a secondary liability for manslaughter offences-119 though statutes can ascribe such liability on corporations regardless of whether those individuals were authorised to do that act, which is unrelated to this research. 120 Lord Raymond CJ, in acquitting the corporation from a homicide charge in R v. Huggins, ruled that "[h]e only is criminally punishable, who immediately does the act, or permits it to be done."
121 Also, the NSW Court of Appeal held that corporations will not be exposed to vicarious liability for a MCN charge. 122 124 MCN is an offence of general intent where the accused intended to commit the act in question without having an intention to cause a specific consequence such as death, and when the issue of liability arises in relation to a crime of intent, the intention of its DM is imputed to the corporation. 125 The act of a corporation, rather than that of its employees, is determined by applying the identification doctrine espoused by the House of Lords in Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. 126 The acts of certain employees of a company can be regarded as being the acts of the entity itself, hence the company can be held directly or primarily, as opposed to vicariously, liable for those acts. 127 Regarding attribution of managing director's conduct to the company, the House of Lords in Lennard's Carrying Co. rejected the argument that the director's fault could not be that of the company itself. 128 Hence, the director's conduct was imputed to the company as the conduct of DM.
The House of Lords analysed and applied the identification doctrine in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, 129 which established that this doctrine can be applied to all corporate offences excluding those of vicarious liability. The identification doctrine applies to cases where the defendant corporation can be convicted based on "the proof of mens rea provided that the natural person who committed the actus reus of the offence could be identified with the corporation" as its DM. 130 The HCA confirmed in Hamilton v Whitehead that the common law identification theory applies in Australia. 131 The application of the doctrine of identification requires the determination of two things: first, to identify the person who has committed the wrongful act, and second, to determine whether that person "can be said to embody the company's mind and will." 132 So, in the application of this doctrine, the conduct of the natural person who embodies the company must be identified and only his/her conduct can be attributed to the company, which cannot be convicted alone without corresponding conviction of that natural person. 133 A single individual, or more than one person acting collectively, such as a board of directors, can be identified as the DM for the purpose of fault element. 134 Regarding DM eligibility, the House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. indicated that only a member of the board of directors can make a corporation criminally liable as its DM. 135 In declaring that a store manager was not a DM, the House of Lords held that attachment of corporate liability to an act of a person requires that " [t] he person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind, which directs his acts is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company [emphasis added]." 136 While considering the appropriate form of mens rea for culpable homicide, "both Lords Hamilton and Osborne went on to conclude that such mens rea may only be brought home to a corporate body by means of the identification principle outlined in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd." 137 The identification doctrine has been applied more recently in Transco PLC v. Her Majesty's Advocate, which reinforces the importance of this doctrine. 138 The English courts in the three leading cases of 1944, discussed earlier, attributed the mens rea of senior executives to their respective companies. 139 The identification doctrine is applicable to all common law crimes including MCN. 140 However, the imputation of mens rea of a senior executive of the company is essential to entity liability.
A further provision regarding omissions allows corporate prosecution even without attribution. Companies can be prosecuted for omissions in two ways. Firstly, the corporate liability for "omissions" is personal, as held by the English Court of Appeal in R v. Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd. 141 The same approach was taken by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in Linework Ltd. v. Department of Labour, which held that the company itself may be said to have failed to act, thereby failed to ensure workers' safety in its own right, so there is no need to attribute someone else's failure. 142 Secondly, the liability for another person's omission can be attributed to the company under the theory of DM; however, the two routes are not mutually exclusive. 143 An action of any employee can be attributed to the company if it falls within the scope of employment and direction of the DM.
The organic theory devised by the House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass 144 is widely disputed 145 in that it makes corporate conviction difficult due to the difficulty in determining the DM, particularly in large corporations. 146 Such complexity is evident in several cases-for example, the Tesco case itself, and an Australian case of R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, in which the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered an acquittal of the company from the manslaughter charge by accepting an argument that the two employees (a plant engineer and plant manager) who committed the wrongful act did not embody the guiding mind of the entity and their conduct was not grossly negligent either. 147 The identification of the DM should be relatively easier in a small company than its larger counterparts. 148 The difficulty in the application of this doctrine to large companies contributed to the enactment of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (UK), which has eased the requirement to identify a DM. 149 The enacted law has significantly contributed to an increased conviction rate in the United Kingdom. 150 With respect to machines like robots, legal scholars consider potential specific failures including: "design defects, manufacturing defects, information defects, and failures to instruct on appropriate uses." 151 Identifying the actor who basically commits the wrong is even more complex, in that the designing, programming, coding, etc. will far exceed the capability of a single individual. 152 Although this is directly relevant to the supply side, the defects and complexities of machines will affect the liability of the user side as well. This is because such complexities will warrant giving risk notifications to workers, arranging adequate training of robots' operators, ensuring proper maintenance of IRs, carrying out appropriate supervision of robots' users, etc. So, a breach of the duty of care can be established by proving a breach of any of these duties by the employer. However, many of the individuals who will be entrusted with these tasks might not be identified as a DM. Thus the complexity is clearly compounded by the common law principle that a company cannot be vicariously liable for MCN offences committed by employees other than those who constitute the DM. If the DM was not at fault, corporations would evade liability immediately although the death occurred due to the criminally negligent conduct of an employee whose punishment may not be sufficient to achieve the objectives of criminal justice. Nevertheless, the doctrine is adopted in Australia and applied in NSW. 153 To conclude, the organic theory makes the entity criminally liable only if the delinquent natural person is regarded as the DM, and at the time of committing the crime he/she had acted as the company, rather than for the company. In other words, he/she embodied the company, which allows attribution of the natural person's knowledge and action or inaction to the corporation. Then the negligence is legally considered to be the negligence of the company itself and it is to be established that the accused corporation through that human agent had greatly fallen short of the standard of care of a reasonable entity in the circumstances in which the wrongful conduct was committed. In the case of IRs, both corporations (employers) and their senior executives can be found to have breached the duty where the breach will be committed by a DM, otherwise the liability will be limited to the wrongdoing individuals who cannot be regarded as DM, whose conduct cannot be attributed to the company. Moreover, the criminal breach at hand fundamentally depends on whether conduct represents the required high degree of negligence. A successful finding of breach will call for the causal link between the negligent conduct and the death occurred as a consequence.
The following section considers the doctrine of causation.
Proving Causation of Death
The breach of a duty of care will not attract punishment unless it is proved that the death in question was caused by an act or omission of the accused constituting the breach. The courts in Justins v R 154 and Lane v R 155 held that it is imperative that the accused's negligent conduct causes death of the deceased. 156 However, in some cases it may not become irrefutably evident that the accused's conduct caused the death. In those cases, the law does provide a solution to such an ambiguity. Common law principles governing causation stipulate that the accused's negligent conduct must be one of the causes of the victim's death and need not be the sole cause. 157 As decided by the NSWCCA in R v Andrew, it is not even necessary to prove that the accused's act was the principal cause.
158 Whether a certain act caused the death of the deceased is a question of fact, 159 and so is the identification of the act causing death as held by the NSWCCA in R v Katarzynski. 160 If more than one life-threatening cause is found in relation to the victim's death, consideration should be given to the determination of whether the accused's negligent conduct was an "operating and substantial" cause of the death. 161 The disputed conduct must be "something more than de minimis," 162 However, it need not be a major cause. 163 If a breach in the chain of causation is found, the conduct of the accused can still be regarded as satisfying the requirement of being an operating and substantial cause where: "[i]t seems to the court that if at the time of death the original wound is still an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the result of the wound." 164 Notably, "robots do not break the traditional chain of causation as long as these machines are not understood as proper legal persons that can interrupt the causal link between the original agency and the harmful outcome of a chain of events." 165 To prove causation, the "but for test" is considered to be a ground rule which lays down that the death would not have occurred but for the presence of the disputed conduct of the accused.
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This rule has its critics and its notion may seem ridiculously broad. 167 However, in practice, courts distinguish between but-for causation and legal causation, and in doing so, they consider whether the accused's negligent conduct was a cause (legal causation), instead of looking for all of the potential causes of a given consequence. 168 The HCA in Royall v R pronounced that the purpose of the doctrine of causation "is to attribute legal responsibility, not to determine the factors which played a part in the happening of an event or an occurrence." 169 Similar to the determination of breach of duty, the objective test is applied to ascertain whether the accused's conduct was a cause. 170 So, the trier of fact-the jury or the judge in the absence of a jury system-shall decide if the accused's conduct was a legal or a substantial cause of the victim's death. 171 A manslaughter conviction should be awarded once the legal causation is objectively proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Assumedly, legal causation in IRs related cases can be proved without much of a hurdle, in that the attack would generally be serious and visible. However, the "Gordian knot" may arise in some instances, particularly in finding out the reason why the robot had attacked the victim in a circumstance where the employer duly performed its duties. In a case where the required gross negligence of the user side cannot be found, the employer can be sued for simple negligence pursuant to a civil remedy claim. If no negligence on the user side can be found, the manufacturer will have to take the responsibility in a products liability case, and the manufacturer, on its own initiative, will then identify the persons whose fault made the machine defective. 172 Simultaneously, the employer must arrange insurance coverage for its employees.
The liability on both sides of errant robots can be justified by relying on the policy reasons, which state that persons injured, through no fault of their own, should receive redress; similarly, one who benefits from a business should pay; and further, predictable liability risks stimulate innovations. 173 Therefore, the potential liability should be considered against both sides of the spectrum; however the criminal liability of the supply side has been placed outside the scope of this Article. Now, an obvious question arises as to who should go on trial first.
IV. PERSONS WHO SHOULD GO ON TRIAL
More than one person may be held liable for an offence of MCN in a single suit. 174 Hence, legally, both the employer-company and its individual officers, including supervisors, can be held liable. When the company itself will be held liable for manslaughter, which is a primary liability under common law, the liability of the wrongdoing officer(s) of the company will be accessorial for aiding or abetting the company's crime. 175 In a case where the individual whose negligence will be found to have been an operating and substantial cause of the deceased's demise, but he/she cannot be identified as the DM, that individual will be personally liable, and the company will escape liability because vicarious liability provisions do not apply to common law manslaughter. In the context of robots in particular, Pagallo argues that "when humans reasonably fail to guard against foreseeable harms as provoked by robots, individuals are to be held responsible even when they had no intent to commit the wrong."
176 These general common law principles apply to individuals, and reaching a judicial decision on their direct liability would be relatively easier compared to the liability of the company.
Since our discussion is focused on workplace safety, we recommend that the employer who bears the primary responsibility to ensure safety of its employees should be sued initially. The employer's liability refers to the liability of the entity and its executives. However, the general common law principles and the organic theory discussed earlier will apply. The employer's liability can be conveniently established in some instances-for example, when the manufacturer has provided adequate warning and instructions regarding safety measures, but the victim's employer has ignored those instructions, it may be possible to show that the employer acted with gross and wicked negligence by exposing its employees to a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm. This may also happen when the manufacturer has made certain disclosures-for example, if the operator of the machine needed training in order to avoid potential danger, but the employer did not allow him/her to undertake the essential training or organise such training before asking the employee to make use of it. 177 In such a case, both the employer-company and the negligent individuals can potentially be held liable. As mentioned previously, an employer can be held liable for both 175 R v Goodall (1975) causing the victim's death is proved beyond reasonable doubt, by applying an objective test which embraces several personal attributes of the accused.
In the event of a prosecutorial failure in proving the elements of manslaughter-for example, in a case in which the employer was negligent, but not grossly or wickedly negligent-then the issue has to be dealt with under the OHS legislation and other civil law provisions.
If the machines are found to be faulty, the employer should take the responsibility to sue the manufacturer under tort or contract law. Manufacturers do have a positive duty to make their products safe. In holding an auto manufacturer liable for defective design and construction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pronounced that "a manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for such use, the issue narrows on the proper interpretation of 'intended use. '" 184 If no negligence or fault is found on any side, the accident should be deemed to be simply a malfunction of the sophisticated machine causing an accidental death, and it should be brought within the insurance coverage.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Manufacturing industries have been using robots in today's world with a trend towards an exponential surge in the usage of such machines in future. They are producing both benefit and harm, the latter of which ranges from bodily harm to death of humans. Time is ripe to ascertain the persons who should be held liable for such irreparable losses in order to minimise them so far as it is possible to do so. Based upon the preceding discussion of manslaughter liability in NSW, it is evident that finding the true culprit of a workplace death inflicted by an IR may not be always an easy task because of the complex and sophisticated nature of the machine.
It is now, however, judicially recognised that "robots cannot be sued," even though "they can cause devastating damage."
186 Accordingly, we regard robots as objects rather than subjects of law. We have briefly negated the need for separate personality of robots for the purposes of criminal liability at this stage, and have argued that both humans and corporations involved in the user side and/or the supply side of such machines should take the responsibility for such deaths. In so doing, we have analysed the common law constituent elements of manslaughter as they apply in Australia.
187 It would be difficult to prove guilt against the corporation owing to the burden of proof regarding the entity's DM under the common law organic theory. This difficulty relates mostly to the proof of a critical element of MCN being breach of the duty of care by an individual who must have acted as the company, rather than for the company, as the theory requires the prosecution to prove in order to convict a company. Other requirements of a MCN are: the existence of a duty of care, grossly and wickedly negligent conduct of a human being constituting a breach of the duty of care, and a causal link between death and the negligent conduct. These three factors are considered in light of the conduct of human beings who cause the breach in dispute.
The general findings in this article are that persons who should be tried for manslaughter include the employer corporation, its senior executives, supervisors, and other individuals who had a link to the operation of robots. Of course, the conviction of any individuals should be based on the proof of personal fault, or the required high degree of negligence. If only simple negligence is found, the employer should be held liable under OHS legislation and/or civil law provisions as applicable to the facts. In a case of defective machine, the employer should take the responsibility to sue the manufacturer and recover adequate compensation for the victim's family in addition to any available compensation to be paid by the employer. Generally, manufacturers are primarily liable to the consumers for defective products, but IRs are purchased by factories and operated by their employees who are entitled to have a well-protected work environment from their employer.
making a move to make laws for the prevention and punishment of such a serious offence; rather, we need to accept that sooner is better. Special circumstances warrant special legal treatment at all times and in all societies, and it cannot be ignored that IRs have already created that exceptional case worldwide which necessitates appropriate law in NSW that can set forth a good example for others around the world. If we ignore the safety concern today, we will have to submit ourselves to the desire of robots at some point, and then an obvious question shall arise: "should we ever end up in a world ruled by robots?" 205
